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Abstract
We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria of bimatrix games, in a
setting where players initially know their own payoffs but not the payoffs of the other player.
In order for a solution of reasonable quality to be found, some amount of communication needs
to take place between the players. We are interested in algorithms where the communication
is substantially less than the contents of a payoff matrix, for example logarithmic in the size of
the matrix. When the communication is polylogarithmic in the number of strategies n, we show
how to obtain ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium for ǫ approximately 0· 438, and for well-supported
approximate equilibria we obtain ǫ approximately 0· 732. For one-way communication we show
that ǫ = 1
2
is achievable, but no constant improvement over 1
2
is possible, even with unlimited
one-way communication. For well-supported equilibria, no value of ǫ < 1 is achievable with
one-way communication. When the players do not communicate at all, ǫ-Nash equilibria can
be obtained for ǫ = 3
4
, and we also give a lower bound of slightly more than 1
2
on the lowest
constant ǫ achievable.
1 Introduction
Algorithmic game theory is concerned not just with properties of a solution concept, but also how
that solution can be obtained. It is considered desirable that the outcome of a game should be
“easy to compute”, which is typically formalised as polynomial-time computability, in the algo-
rithms community. In that respect the PPAD-completeness results of [8, 2] are interpreted as a
“complexity-theoretic critique” of Nash equilibrium. Following those results, a line of work ad-
dressed the problem of computing ǫ-Nash equilibrium, where ǫ > 0 is a parameter that bounds a
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 5th SAGT. The first author was supported
by EPSRC Grant EP/G069239/1 “Efficient Decentralised Approaches in Algorithmic Game Theory”
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player’s incentive to deviate, in a solution. Thus, ǫ-Nash equilibrium imposes a weaker constraint
on how players are assumed to behave, and an exact Nash equilibrium is obtained for ǫ = 0. The
main open problem is to find out what values of ǫ admit a polynomial-time algorithm. Below we
summarise some of the progress in this direction.
Beyond the existence of a fast algorithm, it is also desirable that a solution should be obtained
by a process that is simple and decentralised, since that is likely to be a better model for how players
in a game may eventually reach a solution. In that respect, most of the known efficient algorithms
for computing ǫ-Nash equilibria are not entirely satisfying. They take as input the payoff matrices
and output the approximate Nash equilibrium. If we try to translate such an algorithm into real
life, it would correspond to a process where the players pass their payoffs to a central authority,
which returns to them some mixed strategies that have the “low incentive to deviate” guarantee. In
this paper we aim to model a setting where players perform individual computations and exchange
some limited information. We revisit the question of what values of ǫ are achievable, subject to
this restriction to more “realistic” algorithms.
There are various ways in which one can try to model the notion of a decentralised algorithm;
here we consider a general approach that has previously been studied in [4, 18] in the context
of computing exact Nash equilibria. The players begin with knowledge of their own payoffs but
not the payoffs of the other players; this is often called an uncoupled setting (see Section 1.2.4 for
an overview). An algorithm involves communication in addition to computation; to find a game-
theoretic solution, a player usually has to know something about the other players’ matrices, but
hopefully not all of that information. We study the computation of ǫ-Nash equilibria in this setting,
and the general topic is the trade-off between the amount of communication that takes place, and
the value of ǫ that can be obtained. In uncoupled settings, there are natural dynamic processes
that converge to correlated equilibria, but the results are less positive for exact Nash equilibria, so
this paper can be seen as an investigation into approximate Nash equilibrium as an alternative to
correlated equilibrium, as a solution concept.
1.1 Definitions
We consider 2-player games, with a row player and a column player, who both have n pure strategies.
The game (R,C) is defined by two n×n payoff matrices, R for the row player, and C for the column
player. The pure strategies for the row player are his rows and the pure strategies of the column
player are her columns. If the row player plays row i and the column player plays column j,
the payoff for the row player is Rij, and Cij for the column player. For the row player a mixed
strategy is a probability distribution x over the rows, and a mixed strategy for the column player
is a probability distribution y over the columns, where x and y are column vectors and (x,y) is a
mixed strategy profile. The payoffs resulting from these mixed strategies x and y are xTRy for the
row player and xTCy for the column player.
A Nash equilibrium is a pair of mixed strategies (x∗,y∗) where neither player can get a higher
payoff by playing another strategy assuming the other player does not change his strategy. Because
of the linearity of a mixed strategy, the largest gain can be achieved by defecting to a pure strategy.
Let ei be the vector with a 1 at the ith position and a 0 at every other position. Thus a Nash
equilibrium (x∗,y∗) satisfies
∀i = 1 · · ·n eTi Ry∗ ≤ (x∗)TRy∗ and (x∗)TCei ≤ (x∗)TCy∗.
We assume that the payoffs of R and C are between 0 and 1, which can be achieved by rescaling.
An ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium (or, ǫ-Nash equilibrium) is a strategy pair (x∗,y∗) such that
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each player can gain at most ǫ by unilaterally deviating to a different strategy. Thus, it is (x∗,y∗)
satisfying
∀i = 1 · · ·n eTi Ry∗ ≤ (x∗)TRy∗ + ǫ and (x∗)TCei ≤ (x∗)TCy∗ + ǫ.
We say that the regret of a player is the difference between his payoff and the payoff of his best
response.
The support of a mixed strategy x, denoted Supp(x), is the set of pure strategies that are played
with non-zero probability by x. An approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium strengthens the
requirements of a mixed Nash equilibrium. For a mixed strategy y of the column player, a pure
strategy i ∈ [n] is an ǫ-best response for the row player if, for all pure strategies i′ ∈ [n] we have:
eTi Ry ≥ eTi′Ry−ǫ. We define ǫ-best responses for the column player analogously. A mixed strategy
profile (x,y) is an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium (ǫ-WSNE) if every pure strategy in Supp(x)
is an ǫ-best response against y, and every pure strategy in Supp(y) is an ǫ-best response against x.
The communication model: Each player p ∈ {r, c} has an algorithm Ap whose initial input
data is p’s n × n payoff matrix. Communication proceeds in a number of rounds, where in each
round, each player may send a single bit of information to the other player. During each round,
each player may also carry out a polynomial (in n) amount of computation. (A natural variant
of the model would omit the restriction to polynomial computation. Indeed, our lower bounds on
communication requirement do not depend on computational limits.) At the end, each player p
outputs a mixed strategy xp. We aim to design (pairs of) algorithms (Ar,Ac) that output ǫ-Nash
strategy profiles (xr,xc), and are economical with the number of rounds of communication. This
is similar to the mixed Nash equilibrium procedure of [18], here applied to approximate rather than
exact equilibria.
Notice that given Θ(n2) rounds of communication, we can apply any centralised algorithm A
by getting (say) the row player to pass additive approximations of all his payoffs to the column
player, who applies A and passes to the row player the mixed strategy obtained by A for the row
player. (The quality of the ǫ-Nash equilibrium is proportional to the quality of of the additive
approximations used.) For this reason we focus on algorithms with many fewer rounds, and we
obtain results for logarithmic or polylogarithmic (in n) rounds.
We also consider a restriction to one-way communication, where one player may send but not
receive information.
1.2 Related Work
We start by reviewing some algorithms that we adapt to the communication-bounded setting. Then
we review the background work on communication complexity, and related work in computing Nash
equilibria, including learning of equilibria in uncoupled settings.
1.2.1 Algorithms for approximate equilibria
In recent years a number of algorithms [24, 9, 10, 1, 31] have been developed that compute (in
polynomial time) ǫ-Nash equilibria for various values of ǫ. Of these, Tsaknakis and Spirakis [31]
obtain the best (smallest) value of ǫ, of approximately 0· 3393. The more demanding criterion of
well-supported ǫ-Nash equilibrium, disallows a player from allocating positive probability to any
pure strategy whose payoff is more than ǫ worse than the best response. Progress on polynomial-
time algorithms for this solution concept has been more limited; at this time the lowest ǫ that can
be guaranteed by a polynomial-time algorithm is only slightly less than 23 [12], obtained via a mod-
ification of a 23 -approximation algorithm of Kontogiannis and Spirakis [25]. Prior to that, [9] gave
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a 56 -approximation algorithm, that is contingent on a graph-theoretic conjecture. In this context,
our 0· 732-approximation algorithm substantially improves on the result of [9], both in terms of ap-
proximation quality and a more demanding model (communication-bounded algorithms). However,
we do not know how to obtain the better approximation quality of [25, 12] in the communication-
bounded setting. Next we discuss two of the earlier algorithms in the literature whose ideas we use
here.
DMP-algorithm: The DMP-algorithm [9] works as follows to achieve a 12 -approximate Nash
equilibrium. The algorithm picks a arbitrary row for the row player, say row i. Let j ∈ argmaxj′ Cij′ .
Let k ∈ argmaxk′ Rk′j. So j is a pure-strategy best response for the column player to row i and
k is a best response strategy for the row player to column j. The strategy pair (x∗,y∗) will now
be x∗ = 12ei +
1
2ek and y
∗ = ej . With this strategy pair the row player plays a best response with
probability 12 to a pure strategy of the column player and the column player has a pure strategy
that is with probability 12 a best response.
The DMP-algorithm is well-adapted to the limited-communication setting. Suppose the row
player uses i = 1 as his initial choice of row. The column player needs to tell the row player
her value of j, a communication of O(log n) bits. No further communication is needed. Notice
moreover that the communication is all one-way; the row player does not need to tell the column
player anything.
Subsequent algorithms for computing ǫ-Nash equilibria cannot so easily be adapted to a limited-
communication setting, but we can use some of the ideas they develop, to obtain values of ǫ below
1
2 in this setting.
An algorithm of Bosse et al. [1]: The algorithm presented in [1] can be seen as a modification
of the DMP-algorithm and achieves a 0· 38197-approximate Nash equilibrium. Instead of a player
allocating some probability to some arbitrary pure strategy, the algorithm starts with the row player
allocating some probability to the row-player strategy x belonging to the Nash equilibrium of the
zero-sum game (R − C,C − R). In solving the zero-sum game efficiently we apply the connection
of zero-sum games with linear programming [29, 6, 23]. If the (mixed) strategy profile (x,y) that
constitutes a Nash equilibrium of (R − C,C − R) gives a 0· 38197-approximate Nash equilibrium
for (R,C), this solution is used. Otherwise, the column player plays a best response ej to x and
the row player plays a mixture of x and ek, where ek is a best response to the strategy ej of the
column player. ([1] goes on to improve the worst-case performance to a 0· 36395-approximate Nash
equilibrium.)
Notice that this algorithm cannot be adapted in a straightforward way to our communication-
bounded setup, since it requires a computation using knowledge of both matrices. The starting-
point of our algorithms of Section 4 is the players separately solving (R,−R) and (−C,C).
1.2.2 Communication Complexity
The “classical” setting of communication complexity is based on the model introduced by Yao
in [32]. We will follow the representation in [26]. We have two agents1, one holding an input
x ∈ {0, 1}n and the other holding an input y ∈ {0, 1}n. The objective is to compute f(x,y) ∈ {0, 1},
a joint function of their inputs. The computation of f(x,y) is done via a communication protocol
P. During the execution of the protocol, the agents send messages to each other. While the
1We use agents instead of players to avoid confusion, the communication does not have to be between the players
of the game.
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protocol has not terminated, the protocol specifies what message the sender should send next,
based on the input of the protocol and the communication so far. If the protocol terminates, it
will output the value f(x,y). A communication protocol P computes f if for every input pair
(x,y) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n, it terminates with the value f(x,y) as output.
The communication complexity of a communication protocol P for computing f(x,y) is the
number of bits sent during the execution of P, which we denote by CC(P, f,x,y). The commu-
nication complexity of a protocol P for a function f is defined as the worst case communication
complexity over all possible inputs for (x,y) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n, which we denote by CC(P, f):
CC(P, f) = max
(x,y)∈{0,1}n×{0,1}n
CC(P, f,x,y)
The communication complexity of a function f is the minimum over all possible protocols:
CC(f) = min
P
CC(P, f)
1.2.3 Existing results on communication complexity of Nash equilibria
There are a few results concerning the communication complexity of Nash equilibria. Conitzer and
Sandholm [4] show a lower bound on the communication complexity for 2-player games of finding
a pure Nash equilibrium of Ω(n2), where n is the number of pure strategies for each player. They
also show a simple algorithm that finds a pure Nash equilibrium (if it exists) in O(n2). They do
not extend their analysis to mixed Nash equilibria; their focus is on searching for a pure Nash
equilibrium (if one exists), in contrast with the existence of a mixed Nash equilibrium, which is
guaranteed [28]. For unrestricted bimatrix games, it can be seen that the communication complexity
of finding an exact equilibrium is Ω(n2)2. That observation leads to the question addressed here,
of whether approximate equilibria have lower communication complexity.
Also related to this paper, Hart and Mansour [18] study the communication complexity of
uncoupled equilibrium procedures, (discussed in more detail below in Section 1.2.4) in the context
of multiplayer, binary action games. The emphasis is on lower bounds on the communication
requirement. Analogously to the Ω(n2) communication needed for pure or mixed Nash equilibrium
that we noted above, they obtain a lower bound of Ω(2s) (where s is the number of players) on
the communication needed to find an exact mixed equilibrium, or determine the existence of a
pure one. (Note that in their setting, each player has a payoff matrix of size 2s, so that essentially
all the payoffs may need to be communicated.) On the other hand, they obtain a polynomial
upper bound on the communication required to find a correlated equilibrium, discussed further
below. Their methods do not seem to be applicable in an obvious way to approximate equilibria.
For example, the lower bound for computing a mixed equilibrium involves a game whose solution
requires probabilities having exponentially large descriptions, which would not be needed in the
context of approximate equilibria.
1.2.4 Uncoupled Learning of Equilibria
An extensive literature studies uncoupled procedures for finding game-theoretic solutions. The
terminology “uncoupled” is introduced in [20]; it refers to settings where each player knows his
own (but not the others’) utility function. Then, there is a sequence of rounds (a.k.a. time steps,
2Consider a game where there is a unique, fully-mixed Nash equilibrium. If the payoffs are perturbed slightly, the
resulting equilibrium, for (say) the row player, will be affected in a non-trivial way by all the perturbations of the
column player’s payoffs. This immediately results in the requirement of Ω(n2) communication.
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or periods), in which each player plays a strategy, and receives the payoff resulting from the entire
strategy profile. Our setting of communication complexity is related to this, in that each player
can use his choice of action (in a round) to transmit information. The main difference is that here,
we do not assume a “rational” choice of action where a player tries to maintain his payoff over time
by predicting the choices of his opponents. In our set-up, player communicate some information
over a (hopefully short) sequence of rounds, and afterwards promise to use certain mixed strategies.
Our interest is in both upper and lower bounds on the required length of the sequence. As noted
in Conitzer and Sandholm [4], lower-bound type results generally ignore strategic considerations,
which perhaps helps to justify our own inattention to rationality in this paper.
In the context of uncoupled search for Nash equilibrium, Hart and Mas-Colell [20] show that
when players do not remember the history of play, it may be impossible to reach Nash equilibrium.
Note that the obstacle is informational rather than due to rationality of the players. A subsequent
paper [21] analyses how much of the history of play needs to be recalled by the players. In the case
of mixed (approximate) Nash equilibria, the approach is to test many probability distributions is a
search for one that constitutes an approximate equilibrium; a large number of rounds is required to
achieve this. Foster and Young [15] show how this can be achieved in a “radically uncoupled” setup,
where a player does not directly observe the opponents’ behaviour, but observed it indirectly via
the payoffs he obtains. Again, a very large number of rounds are required to find an approximate
equilibrium. Daskalakis et al. [7] study negative results, namely failure to converge to Nash equi-
librium, for standard multiplicative weights update algorithms, in the context of bimatrix games.
Their results consider three variants of uncoupled dynamics.
There are more natural learning algorithms that converge (in various senses) to the weaker solu-
tion concept of correlated equilibrium (e.g. Foster and Vohra [14], Hart and Mas-Colell [19]). When
we relax our objective from approximate Nash equilibrium to approximate correlated equilibrium,
then learning can take place with a sublinear number of rounds, from a straightforward application
of no-regret learning algorithms. The idea is applied in Theorem 30 of [18]. In particular, we
equip each player3 with a no-regret algorithm, and suppose that at each round it duly selects (and
outputs) a pure strategy, which requires log(n) bits to output. Indeed, Theorem 17 of [18] shows
how exact correlated equilibrium may be found in a polynomial number of rounds.
Foster and Young [15] point out as motivation for uncoupled learning rules, that uncoupledness
prevents a learning rule from behaving like a centralised algorithm and just constituting a theory of
equilibrium selection. In this paper we similarly avoid the possibility of implementing a centralised
algorithm, though restricting to a sublinear number of rounds of communication, so that it is
impossible for one player to reveal all (or even a large fraction) of his payoffs to the other player.
1.3 Overview of our results
For general n×n games we show the following bounds on the obtainable quality of an approximate
Nash equilibrium if we fix the amount of communication allowed. We start by considering a version
where no communication is allowed. Theorem 1 gives a simple way to find a 34 -Nash equilibrium,
in this setting. Theorem 2 identifies a corresponding lower bound of slightly more than 12 . For
one-way communication we exhibit (Theorem 3) a lower bound of 12 − o( 1√n). The DMP-algorithm
can be implemented as an algorithm with one-way communication and gives a 12 -approximate
Nash equilibrium. Therefore the constant 12 in the lower bound of Theorem 3 is tight, in this
context. In Section 4.1 we show how to compute a 0· 438-Nash equilibrium using polylogarithmic
communication. In Section 5 we discuss the significance of the results, along with open problems.
3Indeed, there may be any number of players, not just 2.
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2 Approximate Nash Equilibria with no Communication
The simplest way to restrict communication is to disallow it entirely.4 That means that for each
player p ∈ {r, c}, we must find a function fp from p’s payoff matrix to a mixed strategy, such that
for all pairs of matrices (R,C), we have that (fr(R), fc(C)) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. In this section
we show that the achievable value of ǫ lies somewhere between 0· 501 and 34 . The 34 upper bound
is achieved via a simple algorithm (differing from the 34 -approximation algorithm of [24], in terms
of the solution it finds). Theorem 2 presents the lower bounds of 0· 501.
Theorem 3 in Section 3 furnishes a lower bound of 12 , even when one-way communication is
permitted, and has a simpler proof (the proof is similar to Case 2 in the proof of Theorem 2). This
raises the question: why bother to include a complicated proof (specific to the communication-
free setting) whose result is only a small improvement (over the one-way communication setting)?
The reason is that we rule out the possibility that 12 is in fact the answer, and as we discuss in
the conclusions (Section 5), 12 seems to arise frequently as a barrier to progress in the study of
algorithms for approximate Nash equilibria, so it is informative to rule out that possibility. Our
lower bound of 0· 501 could be increased slightly by tweaking the parameters of the proof, but we
believe that the resulting progress would be incremental.
Theorem 1 It is possible to guarantee a 34-approximate Nash equilibrium, even if there is no
communication between the players.
Proof. Each player allocates probability 12 to his first pure strategy, and
1
2 to his best response
to the other player’s first pure strategy. In detail, let i ∈ argmaxi′ Ri′1 and let j ∈ argmaxj′ C1j′ .
The approximate Nash equilibrium will be fr(R) =
1
2e1 +
1
2ei and fc(C) =
1
2e1 +
1
2ej .
Let i′ be a best pure strategy response of the row player to fc(C). Then his incentive to deviate
is (
1
2
Ri′1 +
1
2
Ri′j
)
−
(
1
4
R11 +
1
4
R1j +
1
4
Ri1 +
1
4
Rij
)
≤
(
1
4
Ri′1 +
1
2
Ri′j
)
−
(
1
4
R11 +
1
4
R1j +
1
4
Rij
)
≤ 1
4
Ri′1 +
1
2
Ri′j ≤ 1
4
+
1
2
=
3
4
where the first inequality holds because i was a best response to column 1 (so Ri1 ≥ Ri′1) and the
next inequalities hold because payoffs lie in [0, 1]. The same kind of argument holds for the column
player. This proves the theorem.
The following lemma provides a construction that is used in Theorems 2 and 3.
Definition 1 Let Mn be a matrix with n columns and
(
n
k
)
rows, where k = ⌊√n⌋ and a row consists
of k 1’s and (n − k) 0’s. Every row is distinct, so the (n
k
)
rows are all the possible sequences with
k 1’s in a row of length n.
Lemma 1 Suppose we have a bimatrix game where the row player’s payoff matrix is Mn (as in
Definition 1). Let x be a mixed strategy for the row player. Then, there exists a column of Mn
such that if the column player uses any mixed strategy y that allocates probability p to that column,
then the row player’s regret is at least p−O(1/√n).
4This is to some extent inspired by earlier work of the first author [16] that studied an approach to pattern classi-
fication in which the set of observations of each class must be processed by an algorithm that proceeds independently
of the corresponding algorithms that receive members of the other classes.
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Proof. The rows ofMn contain 1’s in a fraction
k
n
of their entries. By symmetry, so do the columns,
thus every column contains k
n
· (n
k
)
1’s and (1− k
n
) · (n
k
)
0’s (recall k = ⌊√n⌋).
x assigns a probability to each row of Mn. Define an unnormalised probability distribution Φ
over the columns as follows. Let Φ(j) be the probability that a 1 will be in column j of Mn, given a
row sampled from x. Note that Φ(j) ≤ 1, with equality when every row that is played with positive
probability has a 1 in column j. Because every row contains k 1’s, the sum of over all values j will
sum to k:
∑n
j=1Φ(j) = k.
We define column m to be one with a lowest value of Φ: m ∈ argminj Φ(j). We choose m
to be the special column in the statement of the Lemma, and we suppose that the column player
allocates probability p to m.
Since the sum over all values Φ(j) is k and there are n columns, this means that Φ(m) ≤ k
n
.
When column m is played (and we assume it is played with probability p) it gives the row player
a payoff of 0 with a probability of at least 1− k
n
.
We now consider the row player’s strategy x and construct an improved response x∗ as follows.
x∗ will differ from x in the following way. For every row i we see if its m-th entry is a 1. If this
is the case, we do not change anything. If instead its m-th entry is a 0, we do the following: look
at the entries where there is a 1 in row i. Of all the entries where there is a 1, we select the one
to which the column player’s distribution y gives the lowest probability, say entry a. (i.e. choose
column a ∈ argminj : Mn[i,j]=1 y[j].) Now we move all the probability allocated to row i by x, to
the row of Mn that instead has a 0 in entry a and a 1 in entry m, and is otherwise the same as i.
The probability on entry a is defined as the smallest among all the entries where row i has a
1. We can bound the probability that is allocated to this entry by distribution y. A probability
at least p is given to column m, so a probability of 1 − p can be distributed over the remaining
columns. The column containing entry a has the smallest probability among at least k columns,
so the probability given to column a is at most 1−p
k
.
The result of this construction of x∗ from x is that every row that is played with positive
probability by x∗ will have a 1 in the m-th entry. There is a probability at least (1− k
n
) that a row
sampled from x does not have a 1 in the m-th entry. This means that the increase in payoff from
replacing x with x∗ is at least(
1− k
n
)
· p−
(
1− k
n
)
· 1− p
k
=
(
1− k
n
)
·
(
p− 1− p
k
)
≥ p− 1
k
.
Noting that k = ⌊√n⌋ gives us the desired result.
We use the following technical extension in the proof of Theorem 2. It is a straighforward
corollary of Lemma 1.
Corollary 1 Suppose we have a bimatrix game where the row player’s payoff matrix R has Mn (as
in Definition 1) as a submatrix. Suppose furthermore that all rows of R that do not intersect Mn
pay the row player zero, and for all rows of R that intersect Mn, all columns that are not columns
of Mn pay the row player 1.
Let x be any mixed strategy for the row player that allocates probability at least pr to rows that
do not intersect Mn. Let y be a mixed strategy for the column player, that allocates at least pc to
columns that do not intersect Mn, but allocates probability p to some column ℓ intersecting Mn.
Then, there exists a choice of column ℓ such that the row player’s regret is at least p−O(1/√n)+prpc.
Proof. Suppose x is modified as follows. For rows that intersect Mn, modify their probabilities
according to Lemma 1. For other rows, set their probability to 0, and transfer their probability to
an arbitrary row that has payoff 1 when column ℓ is played.
8
This change increases by p−O(1/√k), the payoffs to the row player resulting from the column
player playing columns containing Mn. Note that this gain is not conditioned on the column player
playing columns intersecting Mn; it is an absolute gain. In more detail, for rows intersecting Mn,
a fraction 1− k
n
of them (w.r.t. probability measure x) have their payoff raised by at least p− 1−p
k
.
For rows not intersecting Mn, their payoffs are raised by at least p.
There is an additional increase to the row player’s payoff due to the transfer of probability from
rows not intersecting Mn to rows intersecting Mn, in the event that the column player plays a
column not containing Mn. In this case the payoffs increase from 0 to 1, resulting in an additional
payoff to the row player of (at least) pr.pc.
In the communication-free setting, each player p computes a function fp from his payoff matrix to
a mixed strategy. We will first introduce a “commitment measure” τp that measures the variability
of mixed strategies that may be selected by p, i.e. the image of the set of all payoff matrices under
fp.
The variation distance between two probability distributions x and x′ over [n], is half the sum
of all positive differences between the two distributions, i.e.
d(x,x′) =
n∑
i=1
1
2
∣∣x[i]− x′[i]∣∣.
For n×n games, let Ωrn denote the set of strategies the row player may use (i.e. the image of fr) and
Ωcn the set of strategies the column player may use. For each player we define his “centre strategy”.
For the row player the strategy crn is the probability distribution such that the maximum distance
between crn and any strategy ω ∈ Ωrn is minimised.
crn = argmin
c
sup
ω∈Ωr
n
d(c,ω)
The centre distribution ccn of the column player is defined in a similar way. The commitment τ
r
n of
the row player is defined as
τ rn = 1− sup
ω∈Ωr
n
d(crn,ω)
The commitment τ cn of the column player is defined similarly. This commitment measure τ
r
n will
be a value in [0, 1] that indicates the variability of strategies a player may use, and is high when
the player always plays strategies that are close to some “central” strategy.
Theorem 2 For bimatrix games with payoffs in the range [0, 1], if each player independently com-
putes a mixed strategy based on his own payoff matrix, then it is impossible to guarantee an ǫ–
approximate Nash equilibrium for ǫ < 0· 501.
Proof. The proof will be a case analysis on commitment. In the proof, our analysis is with respect
to an arbitrary fixed value of n, so we drop the subscript n from the commitment values τ rn and τ
c
n,
also the centre probability vectors crn and c
c
n. We will show that for all n, the regret of a player is
at least 0· 501. We identify two cases:
1. A player has a low commitment: τ r ≤ 0· 05 or τ c ≤ 0· 05
2. Neither player has a low commitment: 0· 05 < τ r and 0· 05 < τ c
Case 1: A player has low commitment
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Assume the column player has low commitment, thus τ c ≤ 0· 05. We use this low commitment to
identify a set of strategies that are quite far apart from each other, under variation distance.
For the column player, take an arbitrary strategy s1 ∈ Ωc. Because τ c ≤ 0· 05, there must be
some strategy s2 with d(s1, s2) ≥ 0· 95, otherwise s1 could be the centre strategy c with τ c ≥ 0· 05.
Now consider the strategy s12 =
s1+s2
2 , thus d(s12, s1) = d(s12, s2) =
1
2d(s1, s2) ≤ 12 . For this
strategy not to be a centre strategy c contradicting τ c ≤ 0· 05, there must be some strategy s3 ∈ Ωc
with d(s12, s3) ≥ 0· 95. Because s1 constitutes half of the strategy s12, it holds that d(s1, s3) ≥ 0· 90
and similarly d(s2, s3) ≥ 0· 90. We have
d(s1, s2) ≥ 0· 95; d(s1, s3) ≥ 0· 90; d(s2, s3) ≥ 0· 90; d(s12, s3) ≥ 0· 95.
The next step is to construct a n × n payoff matrix R of the row player. Only the first 3 rows of
R will contain non-zero entries. The construction of rows 1,2,3 will be such that for i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3},
row i is a best response to si and a poor response to sj (j 6= i).
For every column j of R determine the maximum of s1[j], s2[j] and s3[j]. If s1[j] is the largest,
R1j = 1 and R2j = R3j = 0. If s2[j] is the largest, R2j = 1 and R1j = R3j = 0. If s3[j] is the
largest, R3j = 1 and R1j = R2j = 0. In case of a tie in the comparison of s1[j], s2[j] and s3[j], all
the entries corresponding to the tie get a 1.
Consider columns i for which R2i = 1, so that s2[i] > s1[i]. The total probability assigned
by s1 to these columns is bounded by 0· 05. If the probability on these columns was higher than
0· 05, it would follow that d(s1, s2) < 0· 95. Similarly we can bound the probability assigned by s1
to columns i such that R3i = 1. Since d(s1, s3) ≥ 0· 9 this probability at most 0· 1. From these
observations, we have that at most 0· 15 of the probability distribution s1 is allocated to columns
that could give a payoff of 0 for row 1. Since each column of R contains at least one 1, the remaining
0· 85 probability of s1 will be allocated to columns that have a 1 in the corresponding entry of row
1. The payoff for row 1 if the column player plays s1 is therefore at least 0· 85. We can use a similar
argument to claim that when the column player plays s2, the row player can get a payoff of at least
0· 85 by playing pure strategy row 2, and at most 0· 05 for row 2, and at most 0· 1 for row 3.
For row 3 we use d(s12, s3) ≥ 0· 95. Consider columns i for which R3i = 0, so that either R1i = 1
or R2i = 1. A column i having this property, contributes ≥ 12s3[i] to the overlap between s3 and
s12. Indeed, if both R1i = 1 and R2i = 1, it contributes s3[i] to the overlap. So we can deduce
that with respect to columns selected using s3, Pr(row 1 pays 1) +Pr(row 2 pays 1) ≤ 0· 1. Again,
since each column of R contains at least one 1, the remaining 0· 9 probability of s3 will be allocated
to columns that have a 1 in the corresponding entry of row 3. The payoff for row 3 if the column
player plays s3 is therefore at least 0· 9, while the payoffs to rows 1 and 2 sum to at most 0· 1. To
summarise:
• If the column player plays s1, the row player gets a payoff of at least 0· 85 by playing row 1.
Playing row 2 would give him a payoff of at most 0· 05 and playing row 3 a payoff of at most
0· 1.
• If the column player plays s2, the row player gets a payoff of at least 0· 85 by playing row 2.
Playing row 1 would give him a payoff of at most 0· 05 and playing row 3 a payoff of at most
0· 1.
• If the column player plays s3, the row player gets a payoff of at least 0· 9 by playing row 3.
Playing row 2 would give him a payoff of at most 0· 1 and playing row 3 a payoff of at most
0· 1. Moreover, the sum of payoffs of row 1 and row 2 is at most 0· 1.
Given the row player’s strategy, let (r1, r2, r3) be the probabilities with which he plays rows 1,2,3.
Assume r1 ≤ r2, r3, so r1 ≤ 13 and suppose the column player plays strategy s1. The best response
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strategy (1, 0, 0) has a payoff of a ∈ [0· 85, 1]. Because row 1 clearly gives the highest payoff, the
regret is minimised when this row is played with as much probability as possible, so r1 =
1
3 . Because
the probability on row 1 was defined as the lowest probability, the probability on the other two
rows is also 13 . This gives a regret of at least
a−
(
1
3
a+
1
3
(0· 05) + 1
3
(0· 1)
)
=
2
3
a− 0· 05 ≥ 2
3
(0· 85) − 0· 05 ≈ 0· 517
The analysis for r2 ≤ r1, r3 where the column player plays s2 is similar.
Assume r3 ≤ r1, r2 and the column player plays s3. The best response to s3 has a payoff of at
least 0· 9 and row 1 and 2 combined can have a payoff of at most 0· 1. This gives a regret of at least
a−
(
1
3
a+
1
3
(0· 1)
)
=
2
3
a− 1
30
≥ 2
3
(0· 9) − 1
30
≈ 0· 567
So regardless the strategy of the row player, the regret of the row player is always larger than 0· 501
when the commitment of the other player is at most 0· 05.
Case 2: Neither player has low commitment
Suppose both players have commitment τ r, τ c ≥ 0· 05. Consider the following set of payoff matrices
for the column player: C1, . . . , Cn where Cℓ has a payoff of 1 for every entry in the ℓ-th column
and a 0 elsewhere:
∀i, j : Cℓij = 1 if j = ℓ; 0 otherwise
To achieve a 0· 501-approximate Nash equilibrium, when the column player has payoff matrix Cℓ,
the column player should assign at least 0· 499 to column ℓ.
The construction of the payoff matrix R of the row player will depend on the centre strategy cr
of the row player. Take the (n −√n) rows of R which have the highest values cr[i], where cr[i] is
the i-th entry of cr. We construct matrix R for which these rows are all zero. For the construction
of the remaining
√
n rows of R we consider cc, the centre distribution of the column player. We
select the (n−√n) columns j of R having the highest values cc[j]. If row i is one of the rows with
one of the
√
n smallest entries for cr and column j is a column with one of the (n −√n) highest
entries for cc, then we set Rij = 1. The payoff entries in R that are still undefined can be seen as
a (
√
n×√n)-sub-matrix.
This submatrix will contain a submatrix Mn′ as in Definition 1, where (for k
′ = ⌊√n′⌋) (n′
k′
)
=√
n. The extra columns of the submatrix have all their payoffs set to 1. The entire matrix R
now satisfies the conditions of Corollary 1. Let S be the set of non-zero rows; by construction∑
i∈S c
r[i] ≤ 1√
n
. Since d(x, cr) < 0· 95, we have∑i∈S x[i] < 0· 05+ 1√n , so∑i 6∈S x[i] > 0· 05− 1√n .
Similarly y has measure > 0· 05 − 1√
n
on columns not intersecting Mn′ .
The values of pr and pc in Corollary 1 are 0· 05 − 1√n , and the value of p is 0· 499, so we get a
regret of at least 0· 499 −O( 1√
n
) + (0· 05 −O( 1√
n
))2 = 0· 5015 −O( 1√
n
).
3 One-way Communication
We noted in Section 1.2.1 that ǫ = 12 can be achieved with one-way communication, by a simple
implementation of the DMP-algorithm, using logarithmic communication. The following result
gives a matching lower bound of 12 . It thus also furnishes a slightly simpler lower-bound result
for the communication-free setting of the previous section, but of course the lower bound itself is
necessarily weaker.
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Theorem 3 It is impossible to guarantee to find an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, for any constant ǫ < 12 ,
with unlimited one-way communication.
Proof. We consider games G = (R,C), where R and C are payoff matrices with dimensions
(
n
k
)×n,
with k ≈ √n. Consider the following set of column player payoff matrices C1, . . . , Cn, where Cℓ
has a payoff of 1 for every entry in the ℓ-th column and a 0 elsewhere:
∀i, j : Cℓij = 1 if j = ℓ; 0 otherwise
The row player has matrix R =Mn with Mn as in Definition 1.
Let x be the strategy of the row player, resulting from matrix R. Let yℓ be the strategy of the
column player resulting from matrices R and Cℓ; note that with unlimited one-way communication
we can assume that the row player communicates all of R (and indeed, x) to the column player.
We will show that for this class of games, one cannot do better than a (12 − o( 1√n))-approximate
Nash equilibrium.
We search for a lower bound of 12 − z, and we identify that a value of z of 1√n applies.
First observe that a best response for the column player having matrix Cℓ is eℓ, the pure
strategy of column ℓ. Column ℓ has payoff 1 and other columns have payoff 0. So to reach a
(12 − z)-approximate Nash equilibrium, yℓ must allocate a probability at least (12 + z) to column ℓ.
So, an arbitrary column ℓ can be required to have probability at least 12 − z. Lemma 1 says
that the row player’s regret is at least 12 − z − O( 1√n). Put z = 1√n and we find that for all x, ℓ
may be chosen such that in order for the column player to have regret less than 12 − O( 1√n), the
row player must have regret at least 12 −O( 1√n).
Theorem 4 It is impossible to guarantee to find an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, for any
constant ǫ < 1, with unlimited one-way communication.
Proof. To prove this theorem we will only have to look at 2 × 2 games. The row player has the
identity matrix and the column player has one of two different column matrices. Communication
is only allowed from the row player to the column player.
R =
(
1 0
0 1
)
and C1 =
(
1 0
1 0
)
or C2 =
(
0 1
0 1
)
In any ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium for ǫ < 1, the column player must play pure strategy
column j, given payoff matrix Cj. That is necessary regardless of the information she receives from
the row player.
No communication is allowed from the column player to the row player, so the row player’s
strategy is determined by matrix R. Let f r(R) be the row player’s strategy. If f r(R) allocates
positive probability to row i, then we fail to have a ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium (for any
ǫ < 1) when the column player has matrix C3−i, since when that happens, row i pays the row
player 0 while the other row pays 1.
4 Communication-bounded algorithms
This section present the main positive results, algorithms that compute approximate Nash equilibria
that are limited to polylogarithmic communication. Section 4.1 gives the main result for ǫ-Nash
equilibria, and Section 4.3 gives a variation of the algorithm that compute ǫ-well-supported Nash
equilibrium for ǫ ≈ 0· 732.
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4.1 A 0· 438-approximate Nash equilibrium procedure with limited communica-
tion
This section provides a 0· 438-approximate Nash equilibrium procedure where the amount of com-
munication between the players is polylogarithmic in n. We present the algorithm as an α-
approximate Nash equilibrium procedure first and then optimize α. At various points the algorithm
uses the operation of communicating a mixed strategy (a probability distribution over [n]) from
one player to the other; the details of this operation are given in Section 4.2. The general idea is
to communicate a sample of size O(log n) from the distribution and argue that the corresponding
empirical distribution is a good enough estimate for our purposes.
First the row player finds a Nash equilibrium for the zero-sum game (R,−R) and the column
player computes a Nash equilibrium for the zero-sum game (−C,C). Since both games are zero-
sum, we know that the payoff values for their Nash equilibria will be unique. Both players compare
this payoff value with α. We distinguish two cases,
1. neither player can ensure himself a payoff more than α, or
2. at least one of the players can ensure a payoff more than α.
With O(1) communication, the case that holds can be identified.
Case 1: the value of both zero-sum games is ≤ α to each player
The row player finds a strategy pair (x∗r ,y∗r) as solution to (R,−R), while the column player finds a
strategy pair (x∗c ,y∗c ) as solution to (−C,C). The row player communicates y∗r to the column player
(as described in Section 4.2) and the column player sends x∗c to the row player. They now play the
game (R,C) using strategy pair (x∗c ,y∗r). Since y∗r is a Nash equilibrium strategy in the zero-sum
game (R,−R) and the row player still plays with payoff matrix R, by the minimax theorem, the
row player has no strategy that can give him a payoff of α or higher. The row player has a best
response with a value of at most α, so his regret is also at most α. The strategy x∗c was a Nash
equilibrium strategy in the zero-sum game (−C,C) and the column player still has payoff matrix
C. So we can use the same argument for the column player to claim that when the row player
plays strategy x∗c , the column player has regret at most α. So, we have a α-approximate Nash
equilibrium. This concludes Case 1.
Case 2: one or both players can guarantee a payoff > α
If at least one of the players has a value of more than α for his zero-sum game, he can get a payoff
of more than α if he plays this strategy, regardless the strategy of the other player. Assume w.l.o.g.
that it is the row player who has a payoff greater than α in his zero-sum game. He communicates
this strategy x∗r to the column player (again, as described in Section 4.2). The column player
identifies a pure strategy best response ej to x
∗
r and communicates ej to the row player (using log n
bits).
At this point in the algorithm we have the strategy pair (x∗r , ej). The column player has a best
response strategy, so at this point his regret is 0. The row player’s strategy x∗r is paying him more
than α. Let β ≤ 1 be the value of his best response to ej. So at this point the row player has a
regret of at most β − α. We next deal with the possibility that β − α > α.
At this stage the column player has regret 0 while we are only looking for regret to be bounded
by α; meanwhile the row player has a strategy that might not be good enough for an α-approximate
Nash equilibrium. To change this, we use a method used in [3] (Lemma 3.2), which allows the row
player to shift some of his probability to his best response to ej. By shifting some of his probability,
it could be that ej no longer is a best response strategy for the column player. This is acceptable,
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as long as the column player’s regret while playing ej is at most α. Suppose the row player shifts
1
2α of his probability to a best response strategy. The payoff the column player gets with ej
could be 12α lower because of this move. The payoff of some other column(s) could go as much
as 12α higher because of this shift. The strategy ej had regret 0, so by the shift of
1
2α of the row
player’s probability, the regret of the column player is at most 12α+
1
2α = α, which constitutes an
α-approximate Nash equilibrium, for the column player.
The row player is allowed to change the allocation of 12α of his probability that was allocated
to strategies having the lowest payoff. The remainder of his probability, 1 − 12α, had already at
least an average payoff of α. The probability is shifted to his best response with a value of β, with
α ≤ β ≤ 1. The following inequality is a sufficient condition for the row player’s regret to be at
most α: (
1− 1
2
α
)
α+
1
2
αβ ≥ β − α , 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ 1
The solutions to this inequality are
0 < α ≤ 12 (5−
√
17) α ≤ β ≤ α2−4α
α−2
1
2(5−
√
17) < α < 1 α ≤ β ≤ 1
α = 0 β = 0 α = 1 β = 1
where it holds that if α = 12 (5 −
√
17) then f(α) = α
2−4α
α−2 = 1 and for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 this function is
monotone increasing. This procedure will give an α-approximate Nash equilibrium, so α should be
as low as possible. Next to this it should also hold for every β with α ≤ β ≤ 1. The lowest α such
that this condition hold is when f(α) = 1, thus α = 12 (5−
√
17) ≈ 0· 438.
So if the row player rearranges 12 · 0· 438 = 0· 219 of his probability to his best response row,
both players have a strategy that guarantees them a 0· 438-approximate Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Communicating Mixed strategies
We describe how to communicate an approximation of the mixed strategies that are computed,
using O(log2 n) bits. We ultimately obtain an ǫ of 0· 438 + δ, for any δ > 0.
We first look at the case where one of the players, assume w.l.o.g. the row player, has a payoff
higher than α in the Nash equilibrium of his zero-sum game (R,−R). The column player plays a
pure best response to the strategy of the row player, regardless of the support of the strategy of
the row player. So we mainly consider the row player.
The zero-sum game (R,−R) gives a strategy pair (x∗,y∗). Fix k = lnn
δ2
and form a multiset
A by sampling k times from the set of pure strategies of the row player, independently at random
according to the distribution x∗. Let x′ be the mixed strategy for the row player with a probability
of 1
k
for every member of A. We want the distribution x′ to have a payoff close to the payoff of x∗.
This corresponds to the following event:
φ = {((x′)TRy∗)− ((x∗)TRy∗) < −δ}
As noted in [27] the expression ((x′)TRy∗) is essentially a sum of k independent random variables
each of expected value ((x∗)TRy∗), where every random variable has a value between 0 and 1. This
means we can bound the probability that φ does not hold, which we will call φ¯. When we apply a
standard tail inequality [22] to bound the probability of φ¯, we get:
Pr[φ¯] ≤ e−2kδ2
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With k = lnn
δ2
, this gives Pr[φ¯] ≤ 1
n2
and Pr[φ] ≥ 1− 1
n2
. If x′ does not give payoffs close enough
to x∗, we sample again.
The strategy x′ has a guaranteed payoff of 0· 438+δ−δ = 0· 438. This strategy is communicated
to the column player. The support of this strategy is logarithmic and all probabilities are rational
(multiples of 1
k
). Communication of one pure strategy has a communication complexity of O(log n).
This will give a communication complexity for x′ of O(log2 n).
The column player computes a pure strategy best response to x′ and communicates this strategy
in O(log n) to the row player. The strategy of the row player might not yet lead to a 0· 438-
approximate Nash equilibrium, his payoff could be too low. As we have seen before, if the row
player redistributes at most 0· 219 of his probability, he is guaranteed to have a strategy that leads
to a 0· 438-approximate Nash equilibrium.
This change in strategy of the row player can decrease the payoff of the column player by as
much as 0· 219 and increase another pure strategy by as much as 0· 219. His strategy was a best
response, a 0-approximate Nash equilibrium, and the improvement to another pure strategy is
maximal 0· 219 + 0· 219 = 0· 438, this leads to a 0· 438-approximate Nash equilibrium.
In the alternative case, where both players have a low (< α) payoff in their zero-sum games,
the technique is essentially the same: each player samples k times from the opposing distribution,
checks that it limits his own payoff to at most α + δ, re-samples as necessary, and communicates
the k-sample.
4.3 A 0 · 732-well-supported Nash equilibrium procedure with limited commu-
nication
We give a variant of the algorithm of the previous section, that produces an ǫ-well-supported Nash
equilibrium for ǫ =
√
3− 1. Like the previous algorithm, we will first search for an α-approximate
Nash equilibrium and later find the optimal value for α.
The algorithm starts in the same way as in Section 4.1 with both players computing the Nash
equilibrium of zero-sum games. The row player solves the zero-sum game (R,−R) and the column
player solves (−C,C). The two cases that arise are also the same; case 1 proceeds as in Section 4.1
while Case 2 requires a variation to the algorithm.
Case 1: the value of both zero-sum games is ≤ α to each player
First consider the case where both players have a Nash equilibrium with value smaller than α.
The row player has a strategy pair (x∗r ,y∗r) and the column player a strategy pair (x∗c ,y∗c). The
row player communicates y∗r to the column player and the column player sends x∗c to the row
player. They will now play the game with the strategy pair (x∗c ,y∗r). If they play according to these
strategies, then no pure strategy yields a payoff of α or more, so note that the strategy profile is
an α-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
Case 2: one or both players can guarantee a payoff > α
Suppose that a player, assume w.l.o.g. the row player, has a payoff more than α in the Nash
equilibrium of his zero-sum game (R,−R). Let the row player communicate this strategy x∗r to
the column player. The column player computes a pure strategy best response ej to x
∗
r and
communicates this strategy to the row player. Because the row player had a payoff of at least α in
the game (R,−R), he also has a payoff of at least α against ej.
At this point in the algorithm we have a strategy pair (x∗r , ej). The strategy of the column player
is a best response to x∗r, so his strategy has regret 0. We have no guarantee on the performance of
the row player’s strategy, in the context of a well-supported Nash equilibrium.
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As in the previous algorithm we allow the row player to shift some of his probability to his
best response to ej. Note that if we shift
1
2α of the probability of the row player, this ensures the
column player’s payoffs vary by at most α.
Let the best response of the row player to ej have value β ≥ α. The row player’s payoff is a
random variable x that takes values in [0, 1] with expectation E(x) ≥ α, since x∗r is the security
strategy for payoff matrix R. The maximum value x can take is β. The algorithm takes all strategies
for which the row player’s payoff is less than β−α, and replaces any probability allocated to them
by x∗r, to any strategy whose payoff is at least β − α, thus satisfying the conditions for the row
player to also have an α-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
We upper bound the probability Pr(x ≤ β−α) as follows. Subject to E(x) ≥ α and max(x) = β,
this is maximised when x takes values β or β − α. Let p = Pr(x ≤ β − α). Then
E(x) < p(β − α) + (1− p)β = −αp+ β.
We have E(x) ≥ α. Plugging that into the above,
α ≤ −αp+ β, i.e. p ≤ β − α
α
.
To ensure that the amount of probability shifted is at most p, is suffices to let 12α <
β−α
α
, i.e.
α2 + 2α − 2β ≥ 0. This is satisfied by α = −1 +√1 + 2β, so that the worst case value of β is 1,
resulting in the claimed value of
√
3− 1 ≈ 0· 732.
5 Conclusions
Our results raise some open problems, such as how good an approximation should be achievable
in the communication-free setting, and how well we can do in the setting of limited (two-way)
communication. Our communication-bounded algorithms are also based on algorithms that com-
pute approximate equilibria in polynomial time, and it would be very interesting if further upper
bounds on the communication complexity could be obtained for algorithms whose computational
time was not known to be polynomial. Pastink [30] considers some related topics, including the
communication required for approximate equilibria of games of fixed size. It may be that future
work should address the issue of communication protocols where the players have an incentive to
report their information truthfully.
We believe that the communication-limited algorithm for 0· 438-approximate Nash equilibria
is significant, also the 0· 501 lower bound in the communication-free setting, since in the context
of searching for ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria, ǫ = 0· 5 frequently seems to arise as a limit on
what is achievable. For example, if we search for approximate equilibria of constant support, the
DMP-algorithm [9] achieves this for ǫ = 0· 5, however, Feder et al. [13] show that for ǫ < 0· 5, the
support size may need to be logarithmic in n. (The corresponding logarithmic upper bound on the
support size that may be needed, is due to [27].) In a similar way, while Fictitious Play is known
to guarantee to find ǫ-approximate equilibria for ǫ approaching 0· 5 [5], it has also been established
that ǫ = 0· 5 is, in the worst case, a lower bound on the approximation quality attainable [17]. And,
as we find in Theorem 3, 0· 5 is also the best approximation that can be guaranteed when there
is a restriction to one-way communication. Finally, Fearnley et al. [11] show that to find ǫ-Nash
equilibria with ǫ ≥ 12 , a strictly smaller fraction of the payoffs of the game need to be checked, than
is needed for certain smaller positive values of ǫ.
Acknowledgements: The first author thanks Sergiu Hart for useful discussions during the iAGT
workshop in May 2011.
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